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Abstract
Early detection of cancer has held great promise and intuitive appeal in the medical community for
well over a century. Its history developed in tandem with that of the periodic health examination,
in which any deviations—subtle or glaring--from a clearly demarcated “normal” were to be rooted
out, given the underlying hypothesis that diseases develop along progressive linear paths of
increasing abnormalities. This model of disease development drove the logical deduction that
early detection—by “breaking the chain” of cancer development--must be of benefit to affected
individuals. In the latter half of the 20th century, researchers and guidelines organizations began to
explicitly challenge the core assumptions underpinning many clinical practices. A move away
from intuitive thinking began with the development of evidence-based medicine. One key method
developed to explicitly quantify the overall risk-benefit profile of a given procedure was the
analytic framework. The shift away from pure deductive reasoning and reliance on personal
observation was driven, in part, by a rising awareness of critical biases in cancer screening that can
mislead clinicians, including healthy volunteer bias, length-biased sampling, lead-time bias, and
overdiagnosis. A new focus on the net balance of both benefits and harms when determining the
overall worth of an intervention also arose: it was recognized that the potential downsides of early
detection were frequently overlooked or discounted because screening is performed on basically
healthy persons and initially involves relatively noninvasive methods. Although still inconsistently
applied to early detection programs, policies, and belief systems in the United States, an evidence-
based approach is essential to counteract the misleading—even potentially harmful--allure of
intuition and individual observation.
Introduction: The ascendancy of intuition in cancer control
Calls from within the medical system for widespread screening for asymptomatic disease—
with the attendant assumption that such early detection improves outcomes for patients—can
be traced back more than a century. The evolution of programs for the early detection of
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cancer can be linked, in part, to the development of the periodic health examination. Many
authors pinpoint its inception to the British physician Horace Dobell.1–2 In his 1861 treatise,
Lectures on the Germs and Vestiges of Disease, and on the Prevention of the Invasion and
Fatality of Disease by Periodical Examinations, Dobell proposed the routine application of
an exhaustive history, physical examination, and battery of laboratory tests to discover the
“earliest evasive periods of defect in the physiological state;” he believed that periodic
health exams were “the only means by which to reach the evil and to obtain the good.”3
A similar philosophy was emerging in the United States at the beginning of the 20th century.
At the fifty-first annual meeting of the American Medical Association, physician George
Gould extorted, “He is the greatest discoverer who finds the presymptom….There are a
thousand undiscovered…advance scouts and forerunners, to be learned when the slight and
unconscious departures from normality are studied by examinations of the supposedly
well.”4 In statements like these, one can observe an emerging mindset in the medical
community whereby there is a clearly demarcated physiological “normal,” as well as the
hypothesis that diseases develop along linear paths of identifiable states of increasing
abnormalities. This progressive course was intuited to be alterable if noticed early enough in
its development.
These ideas began to be explicitly linked to cancer shortly thereafter. In 1907, Dr. Charles
Childe published a book entitled The Control of a Scourge, Or How Cancer Is Curable. In
it, he described the high mortality rates due to cancer as tragically unnecessary, and put “the
finger on the flaw”:
Early cancer has no symptoms….The victims…are quite naturally lulled by the
entire absence of symptoms into a sense of security....The ignorance of the
importance of the early sign is so great, the temptation to make light of the
apparently trivial symptom so natural….[But] cancer itself is not incurable…it is
the delay that makes it so….If every case of cancer came under the notice of the
[physician] at the earliest possible moment…it requires no stretch of the
imagination…to say that the majority…would be cured.5
Although not yet explicitly codified into a formal theory, the concept of cancer as a series of
advancing abnormal steps (i.e., the linear model of carcinogenesis) can already be seen to
permeate medical discourse. This model of cancer development, in turn, can be seen to drive
general assumptions about how best to tackle the disease. Because cancer was thought to
advance along a series of progressive, increasingly dangerous steps, the logical deduction
evolved that early detection of these aberrancies—by “breaking the chain” of disease
development--must be of benefit to the affected individual. Indeed, Childe takes this
assumption to its extreme, by suggesting that with due diligence, cancer could essentially be
eradicated, simply by vigilant identification of “trivial” early symptoms.
The use of the periodic health exam for early disease detection became cemented into
general medical practice in the 1920s, when the American Medical Association published an
official endorsement and review of the method, and led campaigns to spread its use. The
AMA deemed the universal institution of the practice an obvious step for practitioners:
“Medical experience of the benefits of periodic examinations of presumably healthy persons
is sufficiently widespread to make any detailed reference superfluous.”6 The intuitive appeal
of this approach was so seductive that even anecdotal case reports and case series of its
usefulness (which constituted the bulk of medical evidence during this period) were not
demanded for its general approval and uptake into clinical practice.
The 30s, 40s, and 50s saw an upsurge of large-scale health campaigns directed at the public
advocating early cancer detection, principally attributable to efforts of the American Society
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for the Control of Cancer (ASCC, later to become the American Cancer Society). The
ASCC organized a “Women’s Field Army” in the “fight” against cancer; the focus was on
informing the public of the value of the Pap smear, clinical and self-breast exams, and the
importance of being vigilant for early cancer warning signs. “Delay Kills!” was a frequent
slogan; one poster released during WWII claimed that more people died every 2 weeks from
a delayed cancer diagnosis than had died at Pearl Harbor.7
Criteria for screening: The limitations of intuition
In the late 1960s, the World Health Organization published a paper on the Principles and
Practice of Screening for Disease. In it, Wilson and Jungner elucidated 10 fundamental
principles that were intended to guide decision-making regarding institution of a given
screening test:8
1. The condition sought should be an important health problem
2. There should be an accepted treatment for patients with recognized disease, and
treatment should be better at an earlier stage
3. Facilities for diagnosis and treatment should be available
4. There should be a recognizable latent or early symptomatic stage
5. There should be a suitable test or examination
6. The test should be acceptable to the population
7. The natural history of the condition, including development from latent to declared
disease, should be adequately understood
8. There should be an agreed-upon policy on whom to treat as patients
9. The cost of case-finding (including diagnosis and treatment of patients diagnosed)
should be economically balanced in relation to possible expenditure on medical
care as a whole
10. Case-finding should be a continuing process and not a “once and for all” project.
It is instructive to discuss a few of these points in detail in considering the limits of early
detection strategies. By providing a clear set of criteria required to ensure the effectiveness
of a screening test, these principles initiated a modicum of resistance against the previously
unchecked swell of intuitive thought in cancer control. Applying the WHO criteria, the
periodic health exam’s exhaustive search for any and all “advance scouts” of disease falls
considerably short.
The first—that the condition should be an important health problem—speaks to the
burden of disease in the population, and the overall risk-benefit ratio of utilizing mass
screening for that group. One issue of consideration for rare diseases is whether energies
might be better applied to refining treatment strategies, rather than population-based
screening, because this would allow for more targeted use of finite resources. Furthermore,
systematically testing the entire population for a rare condition might actually harm more
individuals through the morbidity of the exam and diagnostic follow-up than could ever
benefit from the test. The idea that an early detection strategy might have important
associated harms that could outweigh any potential benefits was not commonly considered
until this time.
Earlier treatment of a given disease must bestow a clinical benefit to a patient for early
detection strategies to be worthwhile. If clinical outcomes are the same regardless of when
in the course of the disease the person receives therapy, then there is no justification to be
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made for diagnosing the person at an earlier point in time. Similarly, there should be an
accepted treatment for the disease, because there is harm in diagnosing a disorder earlier
when there is nothing to offer the patient in the way of mitigating the illness. In this
situation, the person gains nothing from the early discovery, but any negative effects of
learning about the presence of the disease—such as anxiety, depression, and economic
burdens of care—can occur sooner.
There should be a recognizable latent or early symptomatic stage to the disease. This
criterion points out that if there is no identifiable stage prior to the onset of symptoms, only
diagnosis, and not early detection, is possible. The concept that there should be a suitable
early detection test or examination that is acceptable to the public is closely related,
since one aspect of suitability is the test’s functionality. Furthermore, if the screening
modality is highly invasive, inconvenient, or unpleasant, it may have a reduced chance of
success because many individuals will simply refuse the test.
The natural history of the condition, including development from latent to declared
disease, should be adequately understood. This criterion has several critical issues
embedded within it. The first of these goes back to the need to establish that earlier
diagnosis and treatment does, in fact, confer a clinical benefit to a patient. The natural
history of a given disease impacts the probability that earlier intervention improves
outcomes, because if one possible course of the disease is the spontaneous resolution/
regression of a previously developing lesion, to avoid net harm to an individual, one should
attempt to restrict detection and treatment to beyond that nodal point in the disease’s
development. An example of this situation would be cervical intraepithelial neoplasia (CIN),
a non-obligate precursor of cervical cancer. The majority of CIN I lesions will, in fact,
spontaneously regress within 1 year; recent evidence suggests approximately half of CIN II
lesions will behave in a similar fashion.9 Cervical cryotherapy or electrosurgical loop
excision may permanently alter the competency of the cervix and, as such, can have
negative effects on a woman’s fertility and pregnancies, so if performed on a lesion that
would have been destined to regress, the intervention could result in pure harm for that
person.10
A second point critical to consider when instituting new early detection programs is that
screening alters the hitherto understood natural history of a given form of cancer. A useful
analogy is picturing cancer as an iceberg of disease. Symptomatic lesions comprise the tip of
iceberg--the part that is above the waterline--and, as such, can be easily observed. However,
cancer includes a wide array of heterogeneous lesions that vary substantially in behavior. In
the absence of screening, these asymptomatic lesions lie below the waterline of observation
and little or nothing is known about the natural history of such tumors. Therefore, the
information that has been gathered about the expected course and prognosis of a given
cancer type is only based upon the behavior of symptomatic lesions. A new screening
modality essentially dips beneath the water surface for the first time, and reveals previously
hidden lesions. This complicates accurate predictions regarding the course of screen-
detected disease, because the natural history of this early lesion has not previously been
observed and followed. These asymptomatic lesions may be far less aggressive in nature or
may follow a different disease course than those diagnosed on the basis of symptoms; one
cannot simply assume that the natural history of screen-detected lesions would follow the
same course as that of symptomatic tumors.11
The 1960s and 70s also saw, for the first time, the medical profession seriously questioning
and rigorously testing the effectiveness of the periodic health exam and select early
detection modalities through randomized controlled trials. A new mode of thought was
emerging in medicine, whereby clinical intuition alone, and a reliance upon pure deductive
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reasoning based upon a scientific theory (that is, the linear model of carcinogenesis), were
no longer considered sufficient proof of the merit of early detection strategies. The Kaiser
Permanente Multiphasic Health Checkup Evaluation and the South-East London Screening
Study Group were two such randomized trials that studied the impact of a comprehensive
health examination on overall mortality.12–14 Neither demonstrated a positive result.
Mammography was formally investigated in randomized trials, including the Health
Insurance Plan of Greater New York (HIP) Study15, the Malmo study16, and the Swedish
Two-County Trial.17 Although these trials had methodological limitations, all three showed
evidence of reduced breast cancer deaths for screened women. The effect of screening with
chest x-ray or sputum cytology on lung cancer mortality was also evaluated in the 1970s in
three randomized trials sponsored by the National Cancer Institute at Mayo Clinic, Johns
Hopkins, and Memorial Sloan-Kettering.18–20 Although these studies also had limitations,
none demonstrated a reduction in lung cancer deaths; there was even a suggestion of
increased harm (attributed to the morbidity of treatment) in the screened population.21
These non-intuitive findings from randomized controlled trials focused additional scrutiny
on screening strategies. Some guidelines-formulating organizations noted serious
deficiencies in the evidence base used to support routine screening recommendations, and
outlined the implications of these evidence gaps in the provision of clinical care. Two of
these groups were the Canadian Task Force on the Periodic Health Examination and the
United States Preventive Services Task Force (USPSTF). The efforts of these organizations
contributed to a conceptual shift in medicine, as the groups explicitly laid out and challenged
core assumptions and intuitions comprising many clinical practices, particularly in the arena
of early detection.
The analytic framework of the U.S. Preventive Services Task Force:
Avoiding heuristic thinking
The USPSTF in particular played a critical role in the move away from intuitive thinking
and the emergence of evidence-based medicine through their development of a formal,
quantitative, and explicit methodology for determining the overall risk-benefit profile of a
given procedure for a population: the analytic framework.22 Figure 1 provides an example of
a basic analytic framework for early detection strategies. The essence of the framework is its
ability to delineate necessary steps in the chain of evidence to demonstrate that a given
practice will be of more benefit than harm to an individual or population. This conceptual
framework is exceptionally valuable because it forces the identification and verification of
the assumptions underlying the use of a practice. It rejects intuition and heuristic thinking in
favor of transparent and objective steps towards scientific proof. Walking through the
analytic framework can be instructive in highlighting the critical elements necessary to
demonstrate the worth of a clinical intervention.
Considering the target population and both benefits and harms of an intervention
First, the framework demands a clear definition of the kinds of people in the population
under consideration. It asks, who is the target of screening? This is done because the overall
risk-benefit profile of the early detection strategy may change depending upon the
characteristics of the chosen population; in fact, it may not just shift quantitatively, but
qualitatively (from a net benefit to net harm). Positive or negative results from one subset of
people cannot simply be extrapolated to the entire population. Also of importance, it forces
one to consider potential harms of both the screening test and that of treatment for the
disease. As pointed out by the WHO criteria, the existence of a successful treatment strategy
is critical for the success of a screening program; in a similar vein, the associated harms of
treatment also carry weight in the overall risk-benefit balance for an early detection strategy.
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The outcome of importance for screening: A reduction in cancer mortality
The framework indicates that the most direct way of establishing the benefit of a test is
through a trial that demonstrates its use results in a reduction in deaths, or, at the very least,
a reduction in important morbidity (conceptualized by the line and arrow marked with a 1).
When direct evidence is lacking, the framework points out that one must consider each link
in the evidence chain before drawing any conclusions about the utility of a screening test.
Avoiding dangers of using intuition: how cancer screening is like flying by instruments
Why is this done? Because intuition—particularly in the field of cancer screening—can
easily lead physicians astray. This is because there are powerful biases associated with early
detection strategies that can fool even the most careful observer. An analogy to flying can be
made here—in common situations (such as when flying in cold front clouds, or where haze
meets the water line), pilots can be led astray by their senses, and this is the reason for the
existence of instrument flying. Pilots learn not to rely upon their own observations in certain
scenarios, which can deceive them; instead, they put their trust in what the instruments are
telling them. These tools have been developed to help pilots fly straight, true, and safe when
their instincts are giving them faulty information. The pyramid of evidence, the analytic
framework, and other evidence-based methodological tools work in a similar capacity; they
provide assistance and assurance where common intuition fails.
The analytic framework attempts to look across studies at the sum total of the body of
evidence to determine where evidence has replaced assumptions and where gaps in our
knowledge still persist. However, biases also exist that can easily obfuscate our ability to
interpret individual studies. This is particularly true for observational evidence, which by
their design cannot control for all of the factors that experimental (e.g., randomized) trials
can. Here are some of the common biases in cancer screening that can send faulty signals,
feed into misleading intuitive beliefs, and deceive even the most astute clinician.
Biases in screening: Healthy volunteer bias
There may be fundamental differences between people that agree to participate in prevention
and early detection programs and those that do not. This is such a common finding that
epidemiologists have given a label to the phenomenon: the “healthy volunteer effect.” On
average, individuals responding to invitations to participate in cancer screening or other
preventive interventions tend to be wealthier, to have attained a higher educational degree,
to be more attuned to health messages (and consequently, exercise more, and smoke and
drink less), and to live longer, than persons who do not participate.
For example, the control populations from the Multiple Risk Factor Intervention Trial (MR
FIT), the Colon Cancer Control Study, and the Physicians’ Health Study each was
documented to have substantially lower-than-expected mortality rates as compared to the
general population.23–25 Non-respondents in the Japanese Public Health Center Study
Cohort had higher age-adjusted relative risks for all-cause mortality than did respondents.26
In the Prostate, Lung, Colorectal, and Ovarian (PLCO) cancer screening trial, standardized
mortality ratios for participants (SMR--the ratio of observed deaths to expected deaths,
where 100 means the rates are the same in both groups) were as low as 28 for diabetes, 37
for cardiovascular diseases, 43 for all-cause mortality, and 56 for non-PLCO cancers. In
fact, even injuries and poisoning occurred almost half as frequently than expected in the
general population: the SMR was 64!27
The healthy volunteer effect can mislead a clinician into believing that early detection leads
to better outcomes for his or her patients, because although the very decision to participate is
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a powerful confounder, the practitioner’s immediate observation is that screened individuals,
on average, appear to do better than those patients who refuse to be screened.
Biases in screening: Lead-time bias
The intent of screening is to advance the date of diagnosis to an earlier point in time than it
would otherwise have been made. However, it does not necessarily follow that an
individual’s lifespan will be prolonged as a result of this activity. Although a person
diagnosed through screening may spend more time aware of the existence of his or her
disease, the date of his or her death might well remain unaltered. Figure 2 depicts this
distinction visually. Lead-time bias is the time that exists between screen-detected and
symptom-detected diagnosis—its existence is a mathematical certainty for all screening tests
(the magnitude will, of course, vary). In Figure 2, although the date of diagnosis has been
moved up considerably through application of a screening test, the time of death for the
individual remains identical.
The concept of lead-time bias helps explain why the use of 5-year survival rates to judge the
value of cancer screening can be so misleading. Clinical trials have documented the
counterintuitive potential of lead-time bias by comparing observed cause-specific mortality
rates to 5-year survival rates in participants. The Mayo Lung Project, a randomized
controlled trial of chest x-ray plus sputum cytology versus usual care for lung cancer
screening, is one example. As Figure 3 shows, the 5-year survival rate after diagnosis
appeared to strongly support the widespread implementation of screening: it was 36%
among screened participants versus 19% for controls, or almost double. However, lung
cancer mortality rates were not statistically significantly different between these two groups;
in fact, they even trended towards an increase in deaths among those that were screened!*21
The efficacy of a screening test (when compared with usual care) cannot be established by
examining survival rates: lead-time bias inserts an inescapable flaw into the measure. Lead-
time bias can also contribute to the positive feedback loop of screening, because, once again,
an individual practitioner is unable to directly observe this confounder. His or her direct
observation would lead to the belief that screening prolongs life—even though all it may, in
fact, prolong, is the period of time during which the patient must be cognizant of the
presence of disease, with any attendant psychological impact.
Biases in screening: Length-biased sampling
Cancer screening tests are more effective at identifying slower-growing lesions than rapidly
advancing ones. Every tumor has its own window of time during which it can be detected in
its asymptomatic state by a given screening test. This time span is necessarily shorter in
duration for rapidly growing lesions that might harm a person; the time span is longer in
duration for slowly growing lesions that may never cause problems. For fast-growing
lesions, the probability that a screening test will be applied during the critical window of
opportunity is smaller. The most important consequence of this phenomenon is that
screening tests, by their very nature, select for cancers that innately possess favorable
prognoses. In fact, even after adjusting for tumor stage, the method of diagnosis (screening
versus symptomatic) has been shown to be an independent prognostic factor for breast
cancer.28–29 This does not mean that the screening test, in and of itself, impacted the course
of that disease; it simply means that the test has “stacked the deck” with more indolent
lesions.
*Although survival and mortality seem to be two sides of the same coin, survival is not 1-mortality. These two statistics have different
denominators. 5-year survival is the number of individuals with the disease alive after 5 years divided by the number of individuals
diagnosed with the disease. Mortality, on the other hand, is the number of individuals that have died from the disease divided by the
total population at-risk for the disease during a given time interval. Unlike survival, mortality rates are not affected by lead-time bias.
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Biases in screening: Overdiagnosis
Overdiagnosis represents an extreme form of length-biased sampling. It occurs when a
lesion is diagnosed that is so indolent that it would never go on to cause problems for the
individual. Overdiagnosis should be distinguished from misdiagnosis. Misdiagnosis
represents variability or uncertainty among pathologists regarding whether a lesion is
malignant or not. It occurs because of the inherent subjectivity in reading pathology slides.
Overdiagnosis, on the other hand, represents a lesion that would generally be read as a
malignant tumor; however, it does not behave like a “typical” malignancy. Overdiagnosis
can occur in two situations: 1) cancers that are so benign that they have virtually no growth
potential: in fact, they might even spontaneously regress; 2) cancers that grow so slowly that
the person would die of another competing cause of death before the tumor generated
symptoms.
Although this is an extremely counterintuitive proposition, it builds on the fundamental
point discussed earlier—tumor biology is not homogenous, and the term “cancer” in all
likelihood represents a multiplicity of disease processes. Although the traditional
explanation of the obligate stepwise development of cancer through a series of increasingly
abnormal stages is accurate in some situations, evidence is mounting that this model does
not adequately explain the entire range of behaviors associated with cancer.
The classic indicator that overdiagnosis is occurring is a rise in incidence of early-stage
tumors coupled with a minor or even nonexistent decline in incidence of late-stage disease.
The operating principle of an effective early detection strategy is that one “pulls” advanced
cancers out of the future and treats them at an earlier stage. One would therefore observe a
strong relationship between a screening-induced increase in the number of early-stage
cancers and a resulting decrease in late-stage disease in the population.
However, when U.S. trends for localized (confined to organ of origin) and distant
(metastases beyond organ or origin of to lymph nodes) incidence rates are examined for
several cancers with broadly disseminated early detection strategies, the expected
correlations between rises in early-stage disease and declines in late-stage tumors are not
seen. Figure 4 presents ecologic data from the SEER database for individuals 40 years of
age and older for breast cancer, melanoma, and prostate cancer. For both breast cancer and
melanoma, increases in the total cancer rate are being driven almost exclusively by changes
in the proportion of early-stage disease, with almost no observed differences in the incidence
rate of late-stage disease over a period of 30 years. For prostate cancer, although there is a
decrease in the rate of late-stage disease observed, the absolute rate of decline makes up
only a tiny fraction of the associated increase in early-stage disease. The inference is that
there are more new cases of early-stage disease being identified than cases of late-stage
disease being prevented: this represents overdiagnosis.
In fact, one recent study has estimated that since the introduction of PSA screening, more
than 1 million additional men have been diagnosed and treated for prostate cancer than
would have occurred in the absence of screening; however, the decline in the mortality rate
for prostate cancer observed over this same time period does not equal—or indeed, even
approach--this observed magnitude of change.30 A recently completed randomized
controlled trial of prostate cancer screening concluded that for every prostate cancer death
averted using PSA, 48 additional men would need to be treated over 9 years.31
Overdiagnosis is a phenomenon that has been demonstrated for multiple types of cancer.
One of the earliest examples to be shown in clinical studies was for neuroblastoma in infants
and young children. In the 1980s, it was discovered that a urine test for vanillylmandelic
acid (VMA) could detect the presence of neuroblastoma before the onset of symptoms. As
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symptomatic neuroblastoma of early childhood is an aggressive disease, several countries,
including Japan, Germany, and one province of Canada, launched population-based
screening programs for the disease. The overall incidence rate of neuroblastoma climbed in
these programs; however, there was minimal or no decline in the rates of late-stage,
symptomatic disease diagnosed. Furthermore, mortality rates in these populations remained
essentially unchanged.32–36 Careful examination of the screen-detected lesions
demonstrated that these tumors generally appeared to have a biological make-up and
behavior that was fundamentally different from that of symptom-detected neuroblastoma.
37–39 Due to these disappointing findings, Japan abandoned the mass screening efforts in
2003, and there has been no noticeable change in neuroblastoma mortality rates since
discontinuing the program.40
Overdiagnosis has also been observed in cancers that are traditionally thought of as
fundamentally more aggressive in nature. For example, the Mayo Lung Project, discussed
previously, examined the impact of chest x-ray and sputum cytology screening on lung
cancer mortality. There were more early-stage cancers detected in the chest x-ray arm (99)
versus in the control arm (51); however, the number of advanced tumors diagnosed were
nearly the same in each group (107 versus 109, respectively).41 Sixteen years after the
original completion of the trial, the imbalance in the number of cancers detected in the two
arms persisted. As the trial failed to show a mortality benefit in the screened arm, the
investigators concluded that the extra tumors must have represented overdiagnosis: No
advantage was gained by diagnosing and treating these additional lesions, and additional
late-stage tumors (to balance out this discrepancy) were not subsequently discovered in the
control arm.21
Even screening modalities that have evidence of efficacy from randomized controlled trials
are not free from the impact of overdiagnosis. A Cochrane review of mammography trials
has calculated the overdiagnosis rate at roughly one-third of screen-detected cases.42
Overdiagnosis has become such a concern that some researchers are now calling for a
change in nomenclature for early-stage screen-detected lesions; instead of continuing to
label these lesions “cancers,” several researchers have proposed the term “indolent lesions of
epithelial origin (IDLE tumors).”43
Potential harms of screening: An underappreciated aspect of cancer
control practices
As previously highlighted, one of the important contributions of the USPSTF was the
introduction of an analytic framework that explicitly considered all of the links in the chain
of evidence required to establish the worth of a screening test. Just as critically, the
framework demands equal attention be paid not just to the potential benefits of earlier
detection and treatment, but to the possible harms as well. Although cancer screening
appears to be an essentially innocuous activity, as it is often a quick and essentially painless
blood sample or radiological exam, the downstream stream effects of the screening exam
can be surprisingly substantial. Because screening exams are performed on basically healthy
persons, and because they (at least initially) involve relatively noninvasive methods,
intuitive thinking in cancer control frequently overlooks the critical question of potential
drawbacks of screening interventions. A brief review of associated harms of early detection
strategies is therefore instructive.
The most common (though not most serious) burden of screening is a false positive test. An
estimate of the cumulative false positive rate for annual mammography demonstrated that
within a decade, a woman had a 50% chance of receiving at least one false-positive exam.44
A more recent analysis examined the likelihood of false-positive results within the context
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of multiple modality cancer screening programs, and found that after 14 tests (3 years), a
man’s risk of obtaining at least one false positive test was 60%; a woman’s, 50%.45
False positive tests are of concern for three reasons. First, they have the potential to generate
negative psychological consequences, such as anxiety, depression, and changes in the
overall perception of one’s health status. For example, one study of men with a false-
positive prostate-specific antigen (PSA) test found that 6 weeks after receipt of a normal
biopsy, 40% of these men--compared with 8% in the control group with normal PSA
results--still worried “a lot” or “some of the time” about a diagnosis of prostate cancer.46 In
another study, men with a normal prostate biopsy after a false-positive PSA test were also
more likely to visit a urologist (71% versus 13%), undergo a second PSA test (73% versus
42%), and have another biopsy (15% versus 1%) within 1 year than men with a negative
PSA test.47
Secondly, as the above finding hints, false-positive tests can trigger a cascade of more
invasive diagnostic follow-up testing, which, in the case of a false positive test, represents
pure harm, as the individual, not having cancer, cannot benefit from the testing process.
However, he or she is subject to any of the complications associated with the confirmatory
procedure. One study of the magnitude of this burden of unnecessary testing estimated that
the probability that a man who has a false positive exam would undergo at least one invasive
test as part of a multi-modality cancer screening program over 14 tests was 29%; a woman,
22%.45 Depending on the cancer in question, the level of invasiveness can be quite high.
For example, in the Pittsburgh Lung Screening Study (3,642 participants), the use of low-
dose CT for lung cancer screening resulted in 28 subjects undergoing a major surgical
procedure (thoracotomy or video-assisted thoracic surgery) for a benign final diagnosis,
compared to 54 persons with a final diagnosis of lung cancer: a ratio of 1 surgery for benign
disease to 2 for cancer.48 In the Prostate, Lung, Colorectal, and Ovarian (PLCO) cancer
screening trial, almost 40% of women with a false-positive transvaginal ultrasound for
ovarian cancer underwent a laparotomy, some with associated hysterectomy and/or
oophorectomy.45
Third, frequent false-positive exams, and the diagnostic testing and follow-up cascades they
create, can generate substantial economic burdens for patients and for the healthcare system.
Lafata et al calculated expenditures triggered by false positive screening exams in the PLCO
trial and found an extra $1,024 and $1,171 for an individual woman or man, respectively,
were spent in the first year after the false-positive test.49
We have already discussed in detail one of the major potential harms of screening:
overdiagnosis. Overdiagnosis represents pure harm to an individual, because although by
definition he or she cannot hope to benefit from the detection of the indolent lesion, the
individual runs the risk of any attendant harms from the resulting diagnostic testing, the
treatment, and even the diagnosis of cancer itself. Furthermore, even the act of labeling a
person with an illness can have an important impact in and of itself on that individual’s well-
being and quality of life. For example, a study of hypertension in an industrial setting found
that after screened individuals were diagnosed with high blood pressure, annual absenteeism
from work increased by nearly 80% (approximately an extra week of work), regardless of
the severity of the hypertension or whether pharmacotherapy was initiated.50 In the United
States, one 2009 study documented increased rates of unemployment associated with the
diagnosis of cancer (34% of cancer survivors versus 15% of healthy controls).51 While one
cause of this disparity is likely physical limitations associated with cancer, job
discrimination52 and difficulties juggling work and chemotherapy treatment schedules53
may also contribute to the difference.
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Finally, harms associated with treatment must also be factored into the overall risk-benefit
ratio of adopting a cancer screening strategy. For example, the harms of radical
prostatectomy for prostate cancer can be considerable, ranging from a 16% rate of urinary
incontinence to a 75% rate of erectile dysfunction.54–55 Another example would be an
estimated thirty-day post-operative mortality of 4–6% for lobectomy and 11–16% for
pneumonectomy in lung cancer patients.56
Common arguments advanced to justify cancer screening interventions
The previous discussion sought to highlight the myriad ways in which even the most
perceptive clinician can be led astray by logic and personal experience in the field of cancer
screening. Obfuscating biases abound, and real potential exists to inadvertently cause harm;
both of these points underscore the need for rigorous, experimental trials of screening
modalities before their widespread application in the general population. The analytic
framework, as envisioned by the USPSTF, should serve as a touchstone for those involved
in policy setting for mass screening programs, as it eschews unreliable intuitive thinking in
favor of a clearly defined, explicit blueprint by which a test can be proven to be of benefit to
a population. A brief review of common arguments employed in the justification of cancer
screening tests reveals that, frequently, the fundamental principles previously described
appear to be misunderstood, de-prioritized, or considered not relevant.
A greater burden of disease
One of the most frequent arguments employed in the justification of the wide-scale
application of a screening modality is that the magnitude of the disease and its attendant
suffering in and of itself validates the utility of screening. A 1993 editorial in favor of PSA
screening for prostate cancer demonstrated this reasoning:
The National Cancer Institute is conducting a prospective, randomized trial to
determine whether or not screening reduces the prostate cancer mortality rate, but it
will take sixteen years to complete this study. It is estimated that half a million men
will die of prostate cancer before this study is completed, and it is unrealistic to
expect clinicians to refrain from using PSA for cancer detection in the meantime.57
An advocacy group that favors early detection strategies for lung cancer utilizes a similar
argument in defense of the use of low-dose CT scans:
It is unconscionable for any agency, public or private, to block lung cancer
screening for high risk populations on the basis of a flawed study which will not be
completed until 2009 or beyond [i.e., the National Lung Screening Trial, a
randomized controlled trial of chest x-ray and LDCT for lung cancer screening].
During that time, another one million people will die of lung cancer.58
The American Cancer Society employed a rationale of “screen pending the evidence” back
in the 1970s, when it advocated third-party payment for screening chest x-rays in part due to
the perceived unacceptability of doing nothing in the face of continuing deaths while clinical
trials were underway.59
When one holds this argument up to the analytic framework, it is clear that while the burden
of disease is obviously an important statistic that drives scientific investigations into both
early detection and treatment strategies, it does not provide an answer to any links in the
evidence chain either establishing the efficacy of the screening effort, or in terms of
quantifying the potential harms that must be offset by benefits to be useful. It may be
intuitively appealing to assume that because more people have a disease, or because the
suffering generated by the disease is greater than that associated with other ailments,
screening must therefore impart a greater impact. However, the assumption that the specific
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screening intervention in question is actually effective drives this chain of logic, and without
additional evidence, remains untested and unproven. Even an effective test may have a high
enough associated burden of associated adverse events to generate a net harm. For example,
in considering whether to screen for prostate cancer, efficacy, while essential, is not the only
concern. As Michael Berry has aptly noted, "It is important to remember that the key
question is not whether PSA screening is effective but whether it does more good than
harm."60
A higher risk of developing the cancer
Related to the issue of burden of disease is the concept that because a certain subpopulation
is at higher risk of developing the disease or its complications, this represents sufficient
cause to screen for the disease. The 2009 National Comprehensive Cancer Network
guidelines on prostate cancer early detection highlight this approach to screening. The
NCCN recommends targeting high-risk groups such as African-Americans and men with a
family history of prostate cancer, and has reduced the age to start screening in these
populations to 40. The stated rationale behind this change—despite the acknowledgement
that published results from randomized controlled trials of PSA were limited to men ages
50–74—is that “young men who belong to a high risk group have a heightened chance of
dying of prostate cancer and will thus benefit from early testing, [whereas] for older men,
more judicious use…is warranted to prevent overdetection.” The guidelines go on to note,
“The Surveillance, Epidemiology, and End Results (SEER) Database shows that prostate
cancer deaths begin to appear in men in their 40s. Accordingly, to prevent these tragic,
untimely deaths, screening for prostate cancer should begin earlier.”61
The American Cancer Society takes a similar approach to justifying the use of MRI for
breast cancer screening as an adjunct to mammography. They recommend annual MRI
screening for women that experienced chest radiation between ages 10 and 30 years, and for
women with Li-Fraumeni, Cowden, and Bannayan-Riley-Ruvalcaba syndromes or that are
first-degree relatives of others with the diseases, based solely on lifetime risk for breast
cancer (and not evidence of effectiveness in either experimental or observational studies).62
Although this type of rationale, when held up to the analytic framework, does get at the
question of the population of interest (that is, who should be screened), it does not address
the full chain of evidence and cannot by itself answer either questions of test efficacy or the
balance of benefits and harms, even for the designated subpopulation. Intuition suggests that
targeting screening efforts at those most likely to be affected by a disease will result in a
greater net benefit while reducing adverse effects of screening (since more people tested
will, in fact, have the disease in question, and fewer healthy persons will be subjected to the
harms of the test); however, in this case, the underlying assumption that requires scrutiny is
whether the test in question is, in fact, effective for anyone. Without evidence that the test
reduces mortality, there can be no assurance that this intuition will hold true.
Finding more cancers: A higher test sensitivity
Another popular rationale used to advocate for new screening tests is that of acceptable
operating characteristics—that is, “appropriate” sensitivity (and, less frequently, specificity).
Closely related to this is the argument that a screening test’s ability to increase the incidence
of early-stage disease—to find more cancers sooner—is in and of itself sufficient proof of
effectiveness.
The ACS guidelines for breast cancer screening with MRI also employed this rationale. It
concluded that the “efficacy of breast MRI has been established” on the basis of evidence
that showed that MRI was more sensitive when compared with mammography for detecting
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cancers (71–100% versus 16–40% in high-risk populations), rather than on evidence that it
reduced disease-specific mortality as compared with mammography. Furthermore, although
the guidelines acknowledged that MRI has “significantly lower” specificity than
mammography—which would result in more false positive tests results, biopsies, and,
potentially, unnecessary treatment—this did not impact the judgment that MRI had been
proven effective and should be implemented. It was instead used as an additional reason
why “screening should be recommended only to women who have a high prior probability
of breast cancer,” with the untested assumption that the risk-benefit ratio would tip in the
correct direction in this subgroup.62
The difficulty with using sensitivity (or the ability to detect more cancers) alone as an
endpoint for evaluating the efficacy of a screening test is that this measure cannot answer the
question of whether finding these additional cancers actually results in a decrease in deaths
or in more benefit than harm. Although it is tempting to assume that the ability to detect
more early-stage lesions must be of benefit, there are two countering forces that can affect
the overall effectiveness of the test.
The first of these is that one must consider any changes in the frequency and severity of
harms that might result from the new screening test. If the test is more invasive or associated
with a greater complication rate, or if it leads to move invasive testing or treatment, the
accumulated harms could potentially outweigh gains.
Second, and most critically, it is important to consider what proportion of the increase in
sensitivity represents aggressive disease (“good” sensitivity) versus overdiagnosis of
essentially indolent disease (“bad” sensitivity). An illustrative example can be found in lung
cancer screening. Low-dose computed tomography has been found to be a more sensitive
screening exam for lung lesions than chest x-ray; however, there are ongoing concerns about
the relative proportion of aggressive disease detected though this newer modality. Serious
questions have been raised by the finding—replicated in several Japanese studies—that,
when CT is utilized as a screening tool, smokers and non-smokers are diagnosed with the
same rates of lung cancer.63–65 This observation is sharply at odds with current
understanding of the epidemiology and etiology of lung cancer, and suggests the presence of
overdiagnosis.
Proponents of colonoscopy for colorectal cancer screening have also promoted the argument
that the ability to find more lesions is sufficient grounds to advocate for a screening
modality. In 2000, the New England Journal of Medicine published 2 studies that showed
that colonoscopy is able to detect right-sided neoplasms that flexible sigmoidoscopy does
not.66–67 This was not an unexpected finding, given that a sigmoidoscopic exam only
extends to the splenic flexure, whereas a colonoscopy extends to the cecum. However, the
accompanying editorial (“Going the Distance—The Case for True Colorectal Cancer
Screening”) used this information to advocate for mass colonoscopy as the primary
screening strategy for Americans:
Although the studies…fall short of proving that life expectancy is increased by
performing colonoscopic screening of persons 50 years of age or older who are at
average risk for colorectal cancer, such an extrapolation of the data is virtually
irresistible….These two new reports reinforce the growing suspicion among
physicians that in recommending flexible sigmoidoscopy…we are promoting a
suboptimal approach….The barrier to reducing the number of deaths from
colorectal cancer is not a lack of scientific data but a lack of…commitment….I
believe it is time for both government and private insurers to provide coverage for
colonoscopic screening for all persons 50 years of age or older…68
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The New York Times picked up on the story and echoed the sentiment that “the test most
commonly recommended to screen healthy adults for colorectal cancer misses too many
precancerous growths and should be replaced by a more extensive procedure.”69
Limiting the evaluation of the effectiveness of colorectal screening tests solely to sensitivity
overlooked several key issues: 1) the relative harms of “the more extensive procedure”—
including bowel perforations, intestinal bleeding resulting in hospitalizations, and adverse
events from anesthesia—which are more commonly observed with colonoscopy than
flexible sigmoidoscopy; and 2) the fact that one must consider the overall efficacy of a
program of screening rather than a single application of the test. It is an important question
to determine if a test applied every 10 years is, in fact, as effective in reducing deaths from
developing cancers compared with tests performed every 5 years (flexible sigmoidoscopy)
or annually (fecal occult blood testing).70
Of interest, two population-based case-control studies have found that although colonoscopy
was statistically significantly associated with a reduced risk of colorectal cancer death for
left-sided tumors, no such association between the risk of death from right-sided colorectal
cancer and the receipt of a complete (i.e., to the cecum) colonoscopy was observed.71,72
Such findings call into question the implicit assumption that simply identifying more
cancers (or polyps) must result in better patient outcomes.
The focus on single-test sensitivity as the essential criterion for effectiveness continues to be
emphasized in colorectal cancer screening guidelines even today. In 2008, the American
Cancer Society, U.S. Multisociety Task Force on Colorectal Cancer (composed of the
American Gastroenterology Association, the American Society for Gastrointestinal
Endoscopy, and the American College of Gastroenterology), and the American College of
Radiology issued joint guidelines on colorectal cancer screening, in which they set a rule
that any test with at least 50% sensitivity at the time of a single application, would be
considered recommendable.73
Furthermore, by placing new emphasis on prevention of cancer rather than early detection as
the primary goal of screening, the guidelines take the argument one step further to suggest
that the efficacy of a given modality should now be based upon its ability to find not cancer,
but rather, precancerous or suspicious lesions. Again, the challenge in utilizing these criteria
as the benchmark for effectiveness is that, by themselves, they fail to consider other
important factors in the risk-benefit equation, including a reduction in mortality, the issue of
overdiagnosis and overtreatment, and the relative harms of screening and diagnostic follow-
up associated with a particular test.
Conclusion: Protecting ourselves from our intuitions
The science of early detection has undergone important developments over the past 100
years. Intuitive reasoning in cancer control policy and practice reigned essentially
unchecked for much of the late 19th and 20th centuries. In an atmosphere where deductive
logic alone, rather than rigorous testing of theory, reigned supreme, the linear model of
carcinogenesis drove key assumptions about the implicit worth of early detection strategies.
In the latter half of the 20th century, recognition of the importance of explicit testing of
heuristic assumptions underlying the promulgation of many screening tests began to grow,
given increasing knowledge about important obfuscating biases that can lead clinicians
astray. The development of an analytic framework as a tool to allow for consistent, clear,
and objective evaluation of a given screening strategy independent of intuitive assumptions,
served as a critical advance for the field. Although inconsistently applied to early detection
programs, policies, and belief systems in the United States, an evidence-based approach is
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essential to provide preventive care that maximizes benefits while minimizing the burdens
of medical intervention. Just like pilots, scientists and clinicians (as well as their patients)
benefit immensely from the utilization of formal instruments designed to counteract the
misleading—even potentially harmful--allure of intuition and individual observation.
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Figure 1. The Analytic Framework of the U.S. Preventive Services Task Force
Generic analytic framework for evaluating a screening test, adapted from the U.S.
Preventive Services Task Force. From Harris RP, Helfand M, Woolf SH, Lohr KN, Mulrow
CD, et al. 2001. Current methods of the U.S. Preventive Services Task Force: A review of
the process. Am. J. Prev. Med. 20(3S): 21–35.
Croswell et al. Page 19













Figure 2. Lead-time Bias
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Figure 3. Survival versus Mortality: The Mayo Lung Project
Figure 3 demonstrates that although 5-year survival is improved in the screening arm
compared with the control arm, deaths due to lung cancer were actually greater in the
screening arm. This illustrates the problem with using survival rather than mortality
calculations when attempting to evaluate the worth of a screening modality—lead-time bias
gives a misleading appearance of benefit in survival rates even when there is increased
disease-specific mortality in the screened population. From reference 21.
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Figure 4. U.S. Trends in Localized versus Distant Cancer Incidence for Breast Cancer, Prostate
Cancer, and Melanoma
Figure 4 depicts total, localized, and distant cancer incidence rates for breast, prostate, and
skin cancer (melanoma) per 100,000 persons ages 40 and older in the U.S. “Localized” and
“distant” are defined as by SEER historic stage A: “Localized” is an invasive cancer
confined to the organ of origin; “distant” is an extension of metastasis to organs not adjacent
to that of origin or to distal lymph nodes. From: Surveillance, Epidemiology, and End
Results (SEER) Program (www.seer.cancer.gov) SEER*Stat Database: Incidence - SEER 9
Regs Limited-Use, Nov 2008 Sub (1973–2006) <Katrina/Rita Population Adjustment> -
Linked To County Attributes - Total U.S., 1969–2006 Counties, National Cancer Institute,
DCCPS, Surveillance Research Program, Cancer Statistics Branch, released April 2009,
based on the November 2008 submission.
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